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Summary: This article considers the Equator
Principles, a voluntary code for environmentally
responsible project financing by commercial and
investment banks. The value of voluntary environmental
approaches is increasingly recognised in the European
Union, and in its Sixth Environment Action
Programme, the European Commission advocated a
voluntary initiative with the financial sector to promote
harmonised standards for green lending and investing.
The article begins by explaining the broader relevance
of financial institutions to sustainable development. The
nature and effectiveness of voluntary environmental
measures to engage the private sector is canvassed
before looking at the Equator Principles in detail. The
article explains what the Principles demand of lenders,
assesses their implementation, and makes some
observations on their adequacy for the promotion of
environmentally sustainable finance.
I. A New Frontier for Environmental
Law
The financial services sector is increasingly recognised
by scholars and policy-makers as an economic sector
that has a significant bearing on sustainable develop-
ment. Comprising primarily lenders, investors and
insurers, the financial sector is environmentally
significant not so much because of its own, direct
ecological footprint, but rather due to its indirect
environmental effects through its loans to and invest-
ments in other businesses. Quite simply, many
companies ranging from mining firms, industrial
manufacturers to small retail businesses depend upon
the financial services sector for funds to start or
expand their operations.1 Since the 1970s, companies
in OECD countries have had to rely increasingly on
external financing, rather than internal funds gener-
ated from their operations, to stay in business.2 The
growing dependence on the financial sector arises also
from the support it provides businesses through
insurance and financial advisory services. Thus, the
pollution and other environmental harms of those
businesses are in a sense also partly the responsibility
of their financiers.
While environmental activists and policy-makers
have long recognised the nexus between financial
markets and sustainability, until recently they were
preoccupied with public development finance. In
particular, multilateral development bank (MDB)
lending from the World Bank and its sister organisa-
tions.3 In addition to the conditions they attach to
project-based development loans, the MDBs have
attracted attention for their influence on the general
economic policy of borrower countries through con-
ditional structural adjustment and sector policy loans.4
Since the 1980s, international economic institutions
have experienced increasing public pressures to mod-
ernise their financial policies to address ecological and
social risks. Some reforms have since been made to
their operations, such as mandatory environmental
assessment of some project financing proposals.5
While the environmental reform of intergovern-
mental development finance is obviously important,
alone it is not enough. The private capital markets
must also be reformed. Private financiers hold greater
capital resources and influence over capital allocation
than governments,6 and their hold over capital funds is
increasing in the context of the globalisation of
financial markets.7
The relationship between financial markets and
sustainable development is problematic. There is
evidence that financial markets do not allocate capital
efficiently, and that unsustainable, speculative bubbles
suck in financial resources while inefficient under-
investment arises at other times or in other sectors.8
1 See generally F.S. Mishkin, Financial Markets and
Institutions (2002); D.S. Kidwell, Financial Institutions,
Markets, and Money (2002).
2 R.L. Deaton, The Political Economy of Pensions (1989) pp.
210–14.
3 See further Z. Plater, ‘‘Multilateral Development Banks,
Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform
Pressures: The Example of Third World Dam-Building
Projects’’ [1989] 9(2) Boston College Third World Law
Journal 169; S. Hansen, ‘‘Macroeconomic Policies and
Sustainable Development in the Third World’’ [1990] (4)
Journal of International Development 533.
4 See J. Warford and Z. Partow, ‘‘Evolution of the World
Bank’s Environmental Policy’’ [1989] 26(Dec) Finance and
Development 5.
5 B.M. Rich, ‘‘The ‘Greening’ of the Development Banks:
Rhetoric and Reality’’ [1989] 19(2) Ecologist 44.
6 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), Institutional Investors in the New Financial
Landscape (1998).
7 A. Harmes, Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten
the Political and Economic Wealth of Nations (2001) chapter
6.
8 Ibid. passim.
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Such capital flows may trigger undesirable social and
environmental effects arising from specific company
and project investment choices. Examples of the
adverse environmental effects of financial institutions
include speculative investments in real estate projects
that blight urban landscapes, the financing of pesticides
for farming, and loans and investments to energy-
intensive companies that contribute to climate change.
Thus, the reform of investment, banking and other
financial services to promote greater sensitivity to the
environment offers a way to reduce the incidence of
unsustainable developments. While financiers profit
from such development, and have the means to
influence it, there has been little policy intervention
until recently.
So far, just a few tentative environmental reforms
that target the financial sector have arisen.9 European
Union (EU) Member States are leading the world in
reforms, and the European Commission sees the main
challenge as improved information disclosure. In its
Sixth Environment Action Programme, the Commis-
sion stated:
The financial sector’s lending and investment activ-
ities have significant indirect environmental impacts
by determining which companies and activities have
access to finance and the conditions attached.
Facilitating disclosure of relevant information by
the financial sector and companies could create an
incentive for ‘‘greener’’ behaviour. . . . The Commis-
sion will work to help the financial sector by
encouraging the systematic incorporation of envir-
onmental cost elements into financial reports.10
Since 2000, legislation requiring pension funds to
disclose their policies on environmental, social and
ethical considerations has arisen in Australia, Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and the United
Kingdom.11 Also, the European Commission has
amended the Eco-Label Regulation (2000) and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (2001) to extend their
reach to the financial sector.12 Corporate environ-
mental reporting obligations are also being revamped
in many jurisdictions to encompass financiers.13
Further, economic incentives, such as The Nether-
lands’ Green Investment Directive, are providing tax
concessions for environmental investment funds.14 But
bolder proposals, such as a proposed amendment to
Britain’s Financial Services and Market Act 2000 to
include sustainable development as one of the
principal considerations of the regulator’s mandate,
have been rejected so far.15
II. Voluntary Environmental Measures
The development of voluntary measures to promote
corporate responsibility
In the absence of deeper regulatory intervention, much
will hinge upon the willingness of lenders and investors
to voluntarily make commitments to environmentally
sustainable finance. Codes of conduct, negotiated
agreements, and unilateral declarations of commit-
ment are some of the various means by which the
private sector can take actions to support broader
public policy goals on social and environmental
causes.16 While definitions of this phenomenon vary
considerably, one general definition of voluntary
environmental measures is that they are:
Commitments undertaken by one or more polluters
or resource users, in the absence of an express legal
requirement to do so, prescribing norms to regulate
their behaviour in relation to their interaction with
the environment.17
The voluntary approach, often described as corporate
social responsibility (CSR) or business self-regulation,
9 See B.J. Richardson, ‘‘Diffusing Environmental Regula-
tion through the Financial Services Sector: Reforms in the
EU and other Jurisdictions’’ [2003] 10(3)Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law 1; Council of Europe,
DG III, Social Cohesion Development Division, Examples
of Economic Solidarity Supporting Regulations in the
Member States of the Council of Europe and of the European
Union (2004).
10 European Commission, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, On the Sixth Environment Action Programme of
the European Community. Environment 2010: Our future,
Our choice, 24 January 2001, 2001/0029 (COD) at p. 19.
11 B.J. Richardson, ‘‘Pensions Law Reform and Environ-
mental Policy: A New Role for Institutional Investors?’’
[2002] 3(5) Journal of International Financial Markets: Law
and Regulation 159.
12 B.J. Richardson, ‘‘Implications of Recent Changes to the
EMAS and Eco-label Regulations for the Financial Services
Sector’’ [2002] 14(2) Environmental Law and Management 131.
13 A. von Ahsen, C. Lange and M. Pianowski, ‘‘Corporate
Environmental Reporting: Survey and Empirical Evidence’’
[2004] 3(1) International Journal of Environment and Sustain-
able Development 5; KPMG Environmental Consulting,
International Survey of Environmental Reporting (1999).
14 L.J.R. Scholtens, Greenlining: Economic and Environmen-
tal Effects of Government Facilitated Lending to Sustainable
Economic Activities in the Netherlands (2001).
15 UK Social Investment Forum, ‘‘UK Social Investment
Forum tells MPs of need to include environment in framework
for financial services regulator’’ (Press Release, 19 April 1999).
16 S. Labatt and V.W. Maclaren, ‘‘Voluntary Corporate
Environmental Initiatives: A Typology and Preliminary
Investigation’’ [1998] 16(2) Environment and Planning C-
Government and Policy 191. Parts of the following discussion
in this section draw upon S Wood, ‘‘Voluntary Environ-
mental Codes and Sustainability’’ in B.J. Richardson and S.
Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (2006):
forthcoming; see also, by way of introduction, A. Mol, V.
Lauber and D. Liefferink (eds), The Voluntary Approach to
Environmental Policy (2000); N. Gunningham and J. Rees,
‘‘Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’’
[1997] 19(4) Law and Policy 363.
17 Wood, supra, p. 15
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is thriving in many countries.18 Among the many CSR
standards and codes of conduct drafted by industry
groups, governments, and non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) in recent decades are the: Responsible
Care, Sigma Guidelines, OECD Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises, the Global Reporting Initiative,
ISO 14000 standard, among many others.19 Comple-
menting these initiatives is a burgeoning literature on
corporate citizenship and business ethics, which
challenges the dominant economic conception of
companies.20
Although it is a worldwide phenomenon, Western
European companies have tended to lead the world in
the depth and breadth of voluntary environmental
commitments.21 The European Commission has
started to pay attention to the role of voluntary
environmental measures for CSR. It has cautiously
welcomed the trend. The Commission in 2002
published a Communication on Corporate Social
Responsibility, which explained:
Codes of conduct are innovative and important
instruments for the promotion of fundamental
human, labour and environmental rights, and
anti-corruption practices – especially in countries
where public authorities fail to enforce minimum
standards. However, it should be underlined that
they are complementary to national, EU and
international legislation and collective bargaining,
and not a substitute to them.22
In its current Sixth Environment Action Programme,
the Commission promised to ‘‘consider a voluntary
initiative with the financial sector which could cover,
for example, exchange of best practice, agreement to
meet harmonised standards for reporting by compa-
nies in the financial sector, for issuing loans, for green
investment funds etc’’.23
Already, several voluntary initiatives specifically for
the financial sector have arisen. In Britain, the Depart-
ment for Environment and the Corporation of London
in August 2002 issued the so-called ‘‘London Principles
of Sustainable Finance’’, which advocate measures to
improve financiers’ engagement with the environment in
making loans and investments.24 In the United States,
an Environmental Bankers Association was formed in
1994 to assemble bankers and other financial institu-
tions involved in environmental risk management to
share relevant technical, risk management and legislative
information.25 Also established in 1994, is Germany’s
Verein fur Umweltmanagement in Banken, Sparkassen
und Versicherungen (Association for Environmental
Management in Banks, Savings Banks and Insurance
Companies). It serves to facilitate the exchange of
information and promote dialogue among financial
entities that are environmentally committed.26 A focus
of the Association’s work has been to develop environ-
mental accounting and reporting methodologies for
providers of financial services.27 Endorsing an essentially
voluntary approach, the Association has proclaimed:
The core issue is whether, and if so how, [financial
institutions] should of their own accord insist on
environmental protection standards going beyond
the national standards applicable in the recipient
States, and how those requirements can be imple-
mented, especially in view of tough international
competition in the [financial] sector.28
Internationally, a catalyst for bringing environmental
issues to the attention of global financial markets is the
United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP)
Financial Institutions Initiative. It began in 1992 with
the release of the ‘‘Statement by Banks on Environ-
mentand Sustainable Development’’, to provide a
18 The ‘‘social’’ in CSR is commonly understood to
incorporate environmental responsibility: see A.J. Hoffman,
From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of
Corporate Environmentalism (2001).
19 K. McCague and W. Cragg (eds), Compendium of Ethics
Codes and Instruments of Corporate Responsibility (2005) p.
9. See further B. Paton, ‘‘Voluntary Environmental In-
itiatives and Sustainable Industry’’ in P. ten Brink (ed.),
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and
Future Use (2002) p. 37; T.P. Lyon and J.W. Maxwell
‘‘ ‘Voluntary’ Approaches to Environmental Regulation’’ in
M. Franzini and A. Nicita (eds), Economic Institutions and
Environmental Policy (2002) 75; J. Moffet and F. Bregha
‘‘Non-Regulatory Environmental Measures’’ in R.B. Gib-
son (ed.), Voluntary Initiatives (1999) p. 15.
20 See e.g. J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsi-
bility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1995) p. 22; J.
Moon, ‘‘The Firm as Citizen? Social Responsibility of
Business in Australia’’ [1995] 30(1) Australian Journal of
Political Science 1. Much of this literature is directed to the
financial sector, e.g. C. Holliday, S. Schmidheiny and P.
Watts, Walking the Talk: the Business Case for Sustainable
Development (2002); R. Sparkes, The Ethical Investor (1995).
21 E. Rehbinder, ‘‘Self-regulation by Industry’’ in G. Winter
(ed.), European Environmental Law: A Comparative Per-
spective (1996).
22 European Commission, Communication from the Com-
mission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Business Contribution to Sustainable Development 2 July
2002, COM(2002) 347 final, at p. 11.
23 European Commission, supra p. 20.
24 Corporation of London and Department of Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Financing the Future.
The London Principles: The Role of UK Financial Services in
Sustainable Development (2002) p. 7.
25 Environmental Bankers Association, at <www.enviro-
bank.org>.
26 Association for Environmental Management in Banks,
Savings Banks and Insurance Companies, at <www.vfu.de/
english_index.html>.
27 See Umweltberichterstattung von Finanzdienstleistern,
Ein Leitfaden zu Inhalten, Aufbau und Kennzahlen von
Umweltberichtern fuˆr Banken und Sparkassen, Environ-
mental Reporting of Financial Service Providers – A Guide to
Content, Structure and Performance Ratios of Environmental
Reports for Banks and Savings Banks (1996).
28 Association for Environmental Management in Banks,
Savings Banks and Insurance Companies, Time to Act:
Environmental Management in Financial Institutions (1998) p. 3.
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normative framework for banks to manage environ-
mental risks.29 In 1995 UNEP sponsored a similar
statement for the insurance company sector.30 In May
1997 a more general ‘‘Statement by Financial Institu-
tions Initiative on the Environment and Sustainable
Development’’ was drafted by UNEP, enjoining signa-
tories to develop environmentally sound management
practises.31 These Statements epitomise a growing
partnership between UNEP and the international
financial community to advance dialogue regarding
the relationship between environment, trade and devel-
opment, and to foster greater accord to environmental
considerations in credit, investment, and other business
decisions.32 The UNEP’s Financial Institutions Initiative
also promotes education, research and information
programmes, sharing of best practices and development
of effective management tools.33 There are now over 200
signatories to the Initiative, including commercial
banks, venture capitalists, asset managers and MDBs.34
Significantly, the UNEP is also finalising a set of
Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI), which will
eventually establish best-practice standards for institu-
tional investors to promote sustainable develop-
ment.34a Climate friendly economic investment is
likely to be a major focus of the PRI.
Also recently, a new environmental code known as
the ‘Equator Principles’ has emerged for the project
finance sector.35 Drafted in 2003 under the auspices of
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation,
the Equator Principles provide a framework that
commit interested banks to develop individual poli-
cies, procedures and practices to ensure that projects
are assessed and carried out according to specific
social and environmental considerations.
Not wishing to be sidelined from the agenda, a
coalition of environmental NGOs in 2003 also drafted
their own code of environmental conduct for financial
institutions, known as the Collevecchio Declaration.36
While the use of voluntary codes and standards in
environmental management has unquestionably
grown, they have not necessarily displaced other
regulatory tools.37 Moreover, one should recognise
that environmental regulation in many jurisdictions
has often been a result of negotiation with subject
organisations and thus contains a voluntary, consen-
sual dimension.38 The model of unilaterally imposed
command regulation is a rarity. Environmental
regulation, from general legislative norms to indus-
try-specific licence conditions, typically arise through
negotiations between governments and polluters and
resource users, even if the outcome are laws that do
not fully satisfy subject organisations.
Voluntary codes – structures, functions and values
Before looking at the Equator Principles in detail, it is
worthwhile to comment generally on the type of
voluntary approach it utilises. Among the various
voluntary environmental mechanisms, the Principles
can be categorised as a third party voluntary code,
developed by third parties to which subject organisa-
tions are invited to implement. Third parties are actors
at arm’s length from both the individual businesses
who implement the codes and from public authorities.
They may be environmental NGOs, industry associa-
tions, international technical standardisation bodies,
or an intergovernmental entity such as the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation in the case of the Equator
Principles.
The contents and aims of voluntary codes vary
greatly. We can distinguish between those that are
performance-based and process-oriented, though most
combine both approaches.39 Performance-based codes
dictate substantive goals for the improvement of
participants’ environmental performance, such as
reduction of waste or other indicators of sustainable
development.40 Process-oriented codes concern the
procedures by which businesses manage their interac-
tion with the environment, without setting specific
targets for environmental performance.41 They may
include, for example, expectations for participants to
publicly report on their environmental activities.
Codes also differ in their regulatory function and
policy scope. Some perform several regulatory func-
tions such as rule making (e.g. target setting), adminis-
tration (e.g. reporting and monitoring), and enforce-
ment.42 In terms of policy scope, some codes target
29 UNEP, Advisory Committee on Banking and the
Environment, Statement by Banks on Environment and
Sustainable Development (1992).
30 Contained in C. Joly, ‘‘UNEP Insurance Industry
Initiative on the Environment: Developments in 1996’’
[1997] 2 International Journal of Insurance Law 171.
31 See UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative on the Envir-
onment, at <www.unep.ch/etu/fi/finserv/mission.htm>.
32 In relation to the activities and achievements of the
Initiative, see UNEP, 2nd Annual General Meeting of the
UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative, Sept 1998, Chicago
(1998); Managing Environmental Risks in Project Finance,
UNEP Financial Institutions Initiative – Fact Sheet No.1 (1999).
33 R. Cooper, ‘‘UNEP’s Financial Institutions Initiative’’
[1999] (Jan/Mar) UNEP Industry and Environment 13.
34 For the list of signatories, see <www.unepfi.org/signa-
tories/index.html?&no_cache=1>.
34a See UNEP, Principles for Responsible Investment at
<www.unepfi.org.work_programme/investment/principles>.
35 The text of the Principles is available at (www.equator-
principles.com>
36 The Declaration is available at <www.foe.org/camps/
intl/declaration.html>
37 Wood, supra.
38 D. Fiorino, ‘‘Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process’’
[1998] 48 Public Administration Review 764 (discussing
practices in the United States).
39 E. Meidinger, ‘‘Environmental Certification Programs and
U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think’’
[2001] 31 Environmental Law Reporter 10162 at p. 10163.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 M. Priest, ‘‘Five Models of Self-Regulation’’ [1997–98] 29
Ottawa Law Review 233 at p. 239.
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specific environmental problems such as pollution
control, while others more comprehensively address
the environment in the context of CSR or sustain-
ability.43 But many codes tend not to be self-executing
and therefore need to be translated into precise
operational requirements to take effect.
In practice, it should be recognised that voluntary
codes are seldom if ever ‘‘voluntary’’ initiatives made
autonomously and freely. Most are adopted because
the relevant actors have been pressured to act.44
However, voluntary codes can be considered ‘‘volun-
tary’’ to the extent their adoption is not formally
obliged by authorities. Pressure on businesses to
undertake voluntary codes may arise from a threat
of mandatory regulation, the prospect of adverse
publicity, the need to distinguish themselves in a
competitive market, demands from a local community,
customers or investors, and industry association
membership rules.45 Further, while the adoption of
voluntary codes is not obliged by official regulation,
they can have legal consequences once adopted.46 An
industry code or standard may be binding because of
subsequent contracts among participating firms (e.g. a
loan covenant between a lender and borrower) or
through an industry-government negotiated agree-
ment, and it may even become the standard for
‘‘reasonable care’’ in negligence actions.
Some commentators see voluntary approaches as
offering a valuable alternative to the much maligned
command styles of environmental regulation.47 Volun-
tary approaches may embody a ‘‘reflexive’’ style of
regulation. In contrast to the heavy hand of command
regulation, which seeks to control behaviour directly, a
system based on reflexive law ‘‘attempts to create
incentives and procedures that induce entities to act in
certain ways and to engage in internal reflection about
what form that behaviour should take . . . the state sets
goals, but shares more of the responsibility for
achieving them with regulated entities’’.48 Policy instru-
ments such as codes of conduct, corporate environ-
mental management systems and economic incentives
are representative of reflexive law. Voluntary codes for
example may promote reflection and learning within
subject organisations, and thereby a positive cultural
change in the management of their business.49
For governments, the appeal of voluntary measures
is the prospect of a reduced regulatory load as
implementation and monitoring costs become more
internalised in the participating businesses.50 The self-
regulated enterprises may also have greater knowledge
of management practices and innovative possibilities
within their area than public authorities.51 Other
advantages to the state may be cost savings from the
emphasis on negotiation rather than litigation to
achieve environmental objectives. This approach may
also lead to higher levels of compliance because
industry feels some sense of ‘‘ownership’’ for the rules
and norms made.52
From the perspective of industry, voluntary com-
mitments can offer a wide range of benefits, including
access to technical assistance, financial aid and
professional certification and public kudos. Thus, the
value of voluntarism has often been framed in terms of
the opportunity for lower costs and the competitive
advantages for business through an improved envir-
onmental profile.53 Participation in voluntary codes
can help reduce company exposure to costly environ-
mental liabilities and lead to improved relations with
stakeholders. Apart from production cost advantages,
market advantages may also accrue from the improved
profile of companies among consumers, financial
sponsors and other stakeholders.54
But many other scholars and policy-makers are
sceptical about whether voluntary codes and standards
43 E.g. ICC Business Charter; ISO 26000; UN Global
Compact.
44 J. Morrison et al., Managing a Better Environment:
Opportunities and Obstacles for ISO 14001 in Public Policy
and Commerce (2000) pp. 8–10.
45 E. Bergman and A. Jacobson, ‘‘Environmental Perfor-
mance Review: Self-Regulation in Environmental Law’’ in
G. Teubner, I. Farner and D. Murphy (eds), Environmental
Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice
of Ecological Self-Organization (1994) p. 208.
46 OECD, Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy in
OECD Countries (1999) pp. 19–20; A. Baranzini and P.
Thalmann (eds), Voluntary Agreements in Climate Policy
(2004) p. 4.
47 See G. Teubner, I. Farner and D. Murphy (eds),
Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The
Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization
(1994); E.W. Orts, ‘‘Reflexive Environmental Law’’ [1995]
89(4) Northwestern University Law Review 1227.
48 D.J. Fiorino ‘‘Rethinking Environmental Regulation:
Perspectives on Law and Governance’’ [1999] 23 Harvard
Environmental Law Review 441, p. 448.
49 J. Nash and J. Ehrenfeld, ‘‘Codes of Environmental
Management Practice: Assessing their Potential as a Tool
for Change’’ [1997] 22 Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment 487 (considering five codes in terms of their
generation of new environmental practices and facilitation
of cultural change in participating organisations).
50 On the acclaimed advantages of business self-regulation,
see A. Ogus, ‘‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’’ in R. Baldwin,
C. Scott and C. Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (1998)
p. 374.
51 J. Verschuuren, ‘‘EC Environmental Law and Self-
Regulation in the Member States: In Search of a Legislative
Framework’’ in H. Somsen et al. (eds), Yearbook of
European Environmental Law, volume 1 (2000) p. 103 at p.
108.
52 Ibid.
53 See K. Lester, ‘‘Protecting the Environment: A New
Managerial Responsibility’’ in D. Owen (ed.), Green
Reporting: Accountancy and the Challenge of the Nineties
(1992) p. 39.
54 See S. Arora and S. Gangopadhyay, ‘‘Toward a
Theoretical Model of Voluntary Overcompliance’’ [1995]
28(3) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 289.
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can provide a viable means of environmental protec-
tion and doubt that they are legitimate instruments of
environmental regulation.55 One major concern is that
voluntary measures may lack transparency and
accountability in the way they are developed and the
means by which interested persons can judge com-
pliance.56 In relation to CSR codes for ethical
investment, the European Commission in its 2002
Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility
commented on the importance of transparency:
For Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) to
contribute to the promotion of CSR, the develop-
ment by rating organisations – independent con-
sultants or SRI departments of investment banks –
of criteria and indicators which identify the factors
of competitive advantage and business success of
socially responsible enterprises is essential.57
Not all codes provide a means of external verification,
usually an essential means of achieving transparent,
accountable decision-making.58 Verification of con-
formity may be achieved in several ways. Self-
verification is where a business self-assesses and self-
determines its own compliance. By contrast, second-
party verification involves compliance being verified
by another party with a commercial interest in the
subject business (e.g. a bank verifying a borrower).
And third-party verification is where an independent,
impartial third party assesses compliance.59
Apart from compliance problems, voluntary mea-
sures may serve to pre-empt regulation and thereby
forestall meaningful change – in other words, they
become a means to disguise business as usual.60
Voluntary regimes have implications for power rela-
tions, as their development, content or implementation
may disadvantage particular actors such as developing
countries, public interest NGOs, governments or the
general public.61 We must therefore ask which actors
and interests are dominant and which are excluded or
marginalised from the environmental decision-making?
Greater involvement of environmental and community
NGOs in the design of voluntary environmental
measures may therefore assist in making these instru-
ments more publicly acceptable. Arguably, self-regula-
tion is not an optimal form of control of activities that
are particularly hazardous, pose risks to third parties or
for those which information is uncertain or controver-
sial.62 Finally, it should be noted that the negotiation
and development of voluntary measures is also
accompanied by transaction costs, and there is the
perennial danger of free riding, whereby some non-
participating businesses take advantage of the benefits
of a voluntary environmental regime without contri-
buting to their costs.63
The remainder of this article considers in detail the
example of the Equator Principles. The aim is to
explain what it demands of financial institutions, to
assess its implementation and to make some observa-
tions about the adequacy of this voluntary measure for
the promotion of environmentally sustainable finance.
III. The Equator Principles
Main provisions
The Equator Principles (EPs) are an international
voluntary code of environmental conduct for banks.64
The EPs were drawn up under the auspices of the
World Bank group, and are directed primarily to
private, commercial lending in developing countries
and emerging economies where borrowers rely more
heavily on external project finance than is the case for
businesses and governments in OECD countries. The
principles arose in the context of pressure from
institutional investors like the Calvert Group of funds
in the United States and Insight Investment in the
United Kingdom, as well as pressure from environ-
mental NGOs such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature
and Friends of the Earth.65
In 2002, the World Bank’s International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the private-sector lending arm of
the World Bank Group, convened a meeting of some
of the world’s major commercial banks to address
environmental and social issues encountered in project
finance. The parties agreed to develop voluntary
guidelines regarding these risks. The result, issued in
June 2003, was the ‘‘Equator Principles’’, to which
interested banks were invited to implement.66 The EPs
are not a self-contained set of principles, but incorpo-
rate other sets of standards, particularly the IFC’s
Safeguard Policies which address: environmental
assessment, natural habitat, pest management, for-
estry, safety of dams, indigenous peoples, child labour,
international waterways, etcetera.
55 See A. Neale, ‘‘Organising Environmental Self-Regula-
tion: Liberal Governmentality and the Pursuit of Ecological
Modernisation in Europe’’ [1997] 6 Environmental Politics 1;
I. Maitland, ‘‘The Limits of Business Self-Regulation’’
[1995] 27(3) California Management Review 132.
56 R.B. Gibson, ‘‘Questions About a Gift Horse’’ in R.B.
Gibson (ed.), Voluntary Initiatives (1999) pp. 3, 6–7.
57 European Commission, supra p. 16.
58 Wood, supra.
59 Ibid.
60 OECD, supra pp. 31–38.
61 See R. Krut and H. Gleckman, ISO 14001: A Missed
Opportunity for Sustainable Global Industrial Development
(1998); N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘‘Shifting the Point of Regulation:
The International Organization for Standardization and
Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment’’ [1995]
22(3) Ecology Law Quarterly 479; R Hillary, Environmental
Management Systems and Cleaner Production (1997).
62 Ogus, supra p. 379.
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64 T. O’Riordan, ‘‘Converting the Equator Principles to
Equator Stewardship’’ [May 2005] 47(4) Environment 1.
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The EPs address project finance, which involves
lending for specific, new projects such as highways,
dams, factories and other major economic invest-
ments. Though the Principles are ‘‘adopted’’ by
interested banks, the bank’s borrowers, whether
government or nongovernment, are expected to adhere
to them so long as the lender has put in place
appropriate policies and procedures. The EPs expect
that each adopting lender’s policies and processes will,
for all projects with a total capital cost of US$50
million or more, provide for the following:
1 The lender must categorise the risk to the environ-
ment posed by a project as either Category A, B or
C, according to standardised guidelines. Category A
includes projects ‘‘likely to have significant adverse
environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse or
unprecedented’’. Category B projects pose impacts
that are ‘‘less adverse’’ than those of Category A
projects. Category C projects are ‘‘likely to have
minimal or no adverse environmental impacts’’;
2 The borrower must complete an environmental
impact assessment (EIA) for all Category A and
Category B projects, which evaluate specified issues,
and prepare an environmental management plan
based on the findings of the project’s EIA;67
3 The borrower or a third party expert, for all
Category A projects and appropriate Category B
projects, must consult ‘‘in a structured and cultu-
rally appropriate way, with project affected groups,
including indigenous peoples and local NGOs’’.
This requires that (a) the assessment or a summary
thereof be made publicly available in a local
language and (b) the assessment and management
plan take account of the required consultations with
project affected groups. For all Category A
projects, the assessment and management plan must
be ‘‘subject to independent expert review’’;
4 The borrower must covenant with the lender to: (a)
comply with the environmental management plan in
the construction and operation of the project, (b)
provide regular reports on compliance with the
plan, and (c) where applicable, decommission
facilities in accordance with an agreed plan; and
5 If necessary, the lender must appoint an indepen-
dent environmental expert to provide additional
monitoring and reporting.
Where an EIA is required, the issues that it must
address, as applicable, include: assessment of baseline
environmental and social conditions; requirements
under host country laws and international agreements;
use of renewable natural resources; protection of
human health, cultural properties, and biodiversity;
impacts on indigenous peoples and local communities;
the cumulative impacts of existing projects, the
proposed project, and anticipated future projects;
and consideration of feasible environmentally and
socially preferable alternatives.
The EPs have been generally well received by the
banking community. A recent study by British law
firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer concluded that
the EPs ‘‘impact on the financial market generally and
their success in redefining banking considerations has
been far greater than anyone could have predicted’’.68
The online magazine Environmental Finance in 2005
described the Equator Principles as ‘‘a shining beacon
for responsible banking’’.69 To date, 33 banks and
other financial institutions including mutual fund
providers and life insurance businesses have pledged
themselves to the Principles, accounting for about 80
percent of the global project financing market.70 But
Japanese71 and French banks are notably absent from
the project-finance banking community that has
endorsed the EPs.72 The participating organisations
have had various motives for signing up to the
Principles, including: the standards expected represent
business as usual, stake-holder and NGO activism,
protection of market share, the desire for a level
business playing field, the voluntary nature of the
standards, and to minimise financial risk taking.73 For
some lenders, subscription to the EPs offer public
relations benefits in the face of increasing NGO
scrutiny of their environmental activities. For instance,
in 2000, the Rainforest Action Group (RAN) began
campaigning against the Citigroup’s funding of old-
growth logging projects and an oil pipeline through an
Ecuadorian nature reserve.74 Thereafter, Citigroup
67 The environmental management plan need not be
prepared for Category B projects if it is not ‘‘considered
appropriate’’.
68 Freshfields, supra p. 1.
69 Environmental Finance: <www.environmental-finance.-
com/2005/0506jun/equator.htm>.
70 Listed at <www.equator-principles.com> (as of Septem-
ber 2005). The adopting institutions are: ABN Amro Bank
NV, Bacnco Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Banci Itau, Bank of
America, Barclays, BBVA, BES Group, Calyon, CIBC,
Citigroup, Credit Suisse Group, Dexia Group, Dresdner
Bank, EKF, HSBC Group, HVB Group, ING Group, JP
Morgan, KBC, Manulife, MCC, Mizuho Corporate Bank,
Rabobank Group, Royal Bank of Canada, Scotia Bank,
Standard Chartered Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Unibano,
WestLB AG, and Westpac Banking Corporation.
71 One reason for fewer Japanese banks participating is
because the Japan Bank for International Co-operation has
its own Guidelines for Coordination of Environmental and
Social Considerations (April 2002). Some Japanese banks
may feel that those guidelines are adequate: Freshfields,
supra p. 66.
72 Ibid. p. 47.
73 Ibid. p. 50. The Freshfields study (p. 65) identified various
reasons why some banks want to stay out of the EPs:
scepticism, necessary internal systems not in place, similar
procedures already in place, and fear of contagion (ie
principles may latter spread like a virus to other arms of the
bank’s business, such as export credit finance or general
lending).
74 M Yeomans, ‘‘Banks Go for Green’’ [30 May 2005] Time
A13.
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began to consult with RAN and in 2004 announced
that it would apply the EPs to its future business
including no further financing of firms that logged
primary rainforests.
The EPs should apply to projects involving more
than US$50 million of financing. To put this figure in
perspective, this threshold excludes only about three
percent of private sector project financing around the
world.75 In any event, some Equator banks have
lowered (e.g. JPMorgan Chase) or abandoned (e.g.
Citigroup, ABN Amro Bank) the $50 million thresh-
old where feasible. JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup
have also extended the Equator-like categorisation to
equity and underwriting transactions (outside of
project finance) even though the use of proceeds may
be unknown.76 The HSBC perhaps goes furthest in this
respect, applying the EPs ‘‘to project advisory roles,
corporate lending where the end use of proceeds is for
a project, and to other forms of financial assistance
such as bonding and guarantees directly linked to
projects’’.77
While some financial institutions outside of the
project-financing sector have embraced the EPs, and
some Equator banks have extended the Principles to
their non-project finance activities, the EPs do not
provide a general framework for promoting environ-
mentally sound financing across the whole financial
services sector. The Principles are structured around
decision-making in project finance. They are not
intended for, and cannot easily be adapted to,
investments made by pension funds or mutual funds,
for instance.
Implementation of the Equator Principles
Ultimately, the value of the EPs depends on how they
are implemented. The quality of implementation
hinges heavily on public accountability, transparency
and enforceability.
On accountability, decisions by a lender regarding
the categorisation of a project or the scope of a related
EIA or management plan cannot readily be challenged.
The categorisation of a project is crucial, for it
influences the types of environmental standards and
procedures that would subsequently be applied. Nor-
mally, environmental legislation would allow interested
persons to review and challenge such a threshold
decision. While affected groups may comment publicly
on an EIA or a proposed management plan, as a
voluntary code the EPs do not provide them with any
legal rights to challenge an assessment or a manage-
ment plan that is deficient. The value of a series of
principles is questionable if one cannot verify that they
are being applied on a project-by-project basis.
The EPs however allow for an independent
environmental expert to monitor a project where
‘‘necessary’’ in the view of the Equator bank, but do
not mandate it. Further, although the principles
require the EIA report to be made public, there is no
similar requirement for the management plan or for
continued public disclosures regarding compliance
once a project has commenced. For some banks, an
open transparent implementation of the EPs may sit
uncomfortably with the protocols of client confidenti-
ality, breach of which can entail civil or criminal
sanctions, and damage the relationship between a
lender and its clients.
A study by BankTrack, an umbrella organisation of
various NGOs, was critical of the Equator banks’
efforts to promote accountability and transparency. Its
2005 review of the Principles concluded that the
majority of them provided only limited reporting of
their implementation of the EPs.78 BankTrack sug-
gested there has also been some hesitancy among
Equator banks to disclose the details (e.g. names,
locations, facilities) of projects that have been financed
or declined.79 On the other hand, a report by
Freshfields more optimistically suggested that the
Principles have led some Equator banks ‘‘into more
structured dialogue with stakeholders and NGOs about
social and environmental aspects of their lending’’.80
On enforceability, the EPs expressly declare that
they ‘‘do not create any rights in, or liability to, any
person, public or private’’. Thus, while borrowers
most adhere to environmental covenants that lenders
include in the loan agreement, lenders themselves are
not contractually bound to comply with the principles
or to enforce them against their borrowers. Of course,
shareholders of a publicly-listed Equator bank might
contend that they have relied on their bank’s public
statements that they are abiding by the EPs. In some
jurisdictions this would enable shareholder suits where
the bank’s reputation (and therefore the business and
shareholder value) suffered because of a failure to
implement the principles.81
The effectiveness of the EPs is being tested early on
by several major, international infrastructure projects.
One is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which
will traverse Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to bring
Caspian Sea oil to the West.82 According to
75 Freshfields, supra p. 11. But there is a risk that sponsors
could ‘‘salami-slice’’ a project so that each part falls below
the $50 million cut-off. But such a financing arrangement
would be impractical for most banks in project financing.
76 Ibid. p. 73.
77 M. Chan-Fishel, Unproven Principles: The Equator Princi-
ples at Year Two. An Anniversary Assessment, commissioned
for Friends of the Earth and BankTrack (June 2005) p. 8.
78 Ibid. p. 5.
79 Ibid. p. 6.
80 Freshfields, supra p. 10.
81 See R. Kraakman et al., ‘‘When are Shareholder Suits in
Shareholder Interests?’’ [1994] 82 Georgetown Law Journal
1733.
82 BankTrack, ‘‘Principles, Profit or Just PR?’’ (BankTrack,
2004); see also ‘‘BTC Project is the First Major Test of the
Equator Principles’’, available at <www.equator-principles.
com/btc.shtml>.
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BankTrack, this project, funded by a consortium of
financiers including several Equator banks, violates
the EPs in several key areas. These include protection
of indigenous peoples and risk of oil pollution of some
ecologically sensitive terrain. However, the pipeline
development consortium has in many respects applied
the EPs in an open manner. To comply with EPs’
public disclosure requirement, the consortium created
a publicly accessible website,83 where the public could
consult the environmental assessments and related
documents, many published in English, Azerbaijani,
Georgian and Turkish. The IFC also devoted a
portion of its website to the BTC project and made
numerous project documents available to the public.84
The BTC case shows that an Equator bank may be
fully in conformity with the decision-making proce-
dures laid down by the Principles yet still ultimately
fund a development that many regard as fundamen-
tally incompatible with sustainable development.
Another controversial project is the Sakhalin II oil
and gas project, in Sakhalin Island, a far eastern
Russian territory. The British Petroleum constructed
project is financed by an international finance con-
sortium including Shell, and Credit Suisse First Boston
(itself an Equator bank). The first stage was financed
with assistance from the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) and Japanese and
US export credit agencies. Environmentalists fear the
pipelines risk oil spills that could destroy rich salmon
fisheries and endanger the rare western gray whale.85 In
June 2005 eight international NGOs placed a full-page
advertisement in the Financial Times urging Credit
Suisse First Boston to abide by its EP sustainability
commitments and to sever its relationship as financial
advisor to the Sakhalin II project.86
Both of these projects highlight, among various
problems, the challenges of upholding the EPs for
projects financed by an international consortium. Not
all of the participating banks may have endorsed the
Principles and how should those that have fulfil their
environmental responsibilities? A few banks explicitly
describe their application of the Principles when
participating in loan syndications with non-EP banks.
For example, the Australian bank Westpac notes that
‘‘in terms of lending to projects alongside non-equator
banks, we require compliance with the Principles
irrespective of the position of non-signatory banks’’.87
The Freshfields study cautioned against unrealistic
expectations given the structure of project financing
arrangements. It suggested that the potential leverage
of lenders over borrowers’ environmental performance
can be limited because banks often do not get involved
in a project financing deal until late in the game when
basic project choices and design decisions have already
been made.88 Further, determined would-be borrowers
who wish to carry out environmentally problematic
projects have various means at their disposal to
circumvent an Equator bank’s demands – such as by
self-financing a project using shareholder funds, re-
financing using limited recourse debt once the project
is completed or in operation, or a project bond or
similar capital markets product.89 The latter problem
points to the need for more comprehensive solutions
that address the entire financial markets rather than
merely project finance.
IV.An Alternative Voluntary Code: The
Collevecchio Declaration
Environmental NGOs critical of the EPs have offered
financial institutions an alternative code of environ-
mental principles. Their Collevecchio Declaration on
Financial Institutions,90 prepared in January 2003,
provides a seemingly more ambitious and stricter set
of environmental standards. Because groups outside of
the financial sector prepared it, the Collevecchio
Declaration presents itself as a more objectively and
independently determined voluntary code. On the
other hand, this circumstance is also possibly a
disadvantage, as the Collevecchio Declaration might
be seen as based on a naive or inaccurate under-
standing of the workings of financial institutions.
The Collevecchio Declaration presents six principles
that financiers should embrace, namely commitments
to: sustainability, ‘‘do no harm’’, responsibility,
accountability, transparency, and sustainable markets
and governance. Its accompanying ‘Implementation
Document’ outlines immediate steps financial institu-
tions should take, such as the adoption of internation-
ally-recognised industry standards for credit, investing
and underwriting transactions. To date 101 organisa-
tions have endorsed the Collevecchio Declaration
principles, though very few endorsements have come
from financial institutions, perhaps because they
probably see the Declaration as too radical and
threatening to their status quo.91
The Declaration differs from the EPs in many ways.
For a start, the ‘‘commitment to sustainability’’
83 At <www.caspiandevelopmentandexport.com/ASP/
Home.asp>.
8 4 S e e <www . i f c . o r g / i f c e x t / s p iw e b s i t e 1 . n s f /
2bc34f011b50ff6e85256a550073ff1c>.
85 See CEE Bankwatch Network: <www.bankwatch.org/
issues/oilclima/sakhalin2/ main.html>.
86 ‘‘Oil is Over. Fund the Future’’ [30 June 2005] Financial
Times.
87 Chan-Fishel, supra p. 7.
88 Freshfields, supra p. 11.
89 Ibid. p. 12.
90 Drafted in Collevecchio, Italy, The Declaration is
available at <www.foe.org/camps/intl/declaration.html>.
91 Most of the endorsements have come from environmental
and civil society NGOs: see further <www.foe.org/camps/
intl/endorsements.html>.
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principle projects a more broad based obligation for
financial institutions, which:
must expand their missions from ones that prioritize
profit maximization to a vision of social and
environmental sustainability. A commitment to
sustainability would require financial institutions
to fully integrate the consideration of ecological
limits, social equity and economic justice into
corporate strategies and core business areas (includ-
ing credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put
sustainability objectives on an equal footing to
shareholder maximization and client satisfaction,
and to actively strive to finance transactions that
promote sustainability.
The EPs diverge from the Collevecchio Declaration in
several other ways. For example, the Declaration’s
‘‘do no harm’’ principle entails an explicit commitment
to categorical prohibitions for the most socially and
environmentally egregious transactions. Concomi-
tantly, the Declaration emphasises a precautionary-
based approach rather than one based on mitigation,
as in the EPs. The Collevecchio Declaration also seeks
to strengthen financiers’ accountability and transpar-
ency – notable perceived weaknesses of the EPs. In
relation to transparency, for instance, it requests that
financial institutions:
be transparent to stakeholders, not only through
robust, regular and standardized disclosure, but
also through being responsive to stakeholder needs
for specialized information on financial institutions’
policies, procedures and transactions. Commercial
confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to
deny stakeholders information.
The Declaration’s accompanying Implementation
Document usefully elaborates on these principles and
gives financiers specific directions on how to promote
environmentally sound financing. For example, in
relation to the Commitment to Transparency, the
Implementation Document provides:
a) Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Financial institutions should publish annual sustainabil-
ity reports according to an internationally recognised
reporting format supported by civil society. Financial
institutions should further include disclosure on the
sustainability profile of the financial institution’s portfo-
lio, a breakdown of core business activity by sector and
region, and the implementation of the financial institu-
tion’s sustainability policies and objectives.
b) Information Disclosure
There should be an assumption in favour of disclosure
of information. Particularly for compiled transactions,
but also for those in the pipeline, financial institutions
should publicly provide information on companies
and significant transactions in a timely manner, and
not hide behind the excuse of business confidentiality.
These and other standards are likely to be too much
for banks and other financiers to accept, at least for
now. The reality is that most financial institutions do
not see the environment as sufficiently relevant to their
business. There are usually only three situations where
banks may consider the environment seriously.92
Firstly, there is the prospect of direct lender liability
where a bank becomes responsible for the environ-
mental liabilities of its clients, such as liability to
cleanup contaminated land.93 Secondly, where envir-
onmental problems generate indirect credit risks for
lenders where a borrower experiences financial hard-
ship, such as by incurring an onerous pollution penalty
fine. Thirdly, there is a reputational risk for banks
when they associate with environmentally controver-
sial developments or firms. For the moment, banks
driven by such concerns will likely find the EPs offer a
suitable safe harbour for demonstrating a commitment
to the environment without radical change to their
lending practices and profit-making opportunities.
V. Conclusions
Despite its critics, the EPs are a step in the right
direction. But the Principles surely cannot in their
current form provide an adequate basis for nurturing a
commitment to environmentally sustainable finance.
The EPs’ core standards are too weak, for they do
posit substantive environmental goals or benchmarks
for banks to achieve. Rather, the EPs provide a
process for incorporating environmental considera-
tions into project financing decision-making. While it
is true that the way decisions are made can influence
the outcome of those decisions (eg requirements to
complete an environment assessment of a proposed
project), a procedural approach depends on publicly
accountable and transparent decision-making to
engender meaningful change.94
A variety of proposals have been canvassed to
strengthen these and other aspects of the EPs. The
Freshfields study recommended that the EP banks
establish an independent commission or Ombudsman to
investigate alleged abuses of human rights and environ-
mental damage relating to financed projects.95 Fresh-
fields also noted that an independent Environment
Bank could be set up to help conduct environmental
assessments and to monitor implementation of the
92 B.J. Richardson, ‘‘Environmental Liability and Banks:
Recent European Developments’’ [2000] 17(10) Journal of
International Banking Law 289 at p. 290.
93 S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘‘Environmental Liability Law’’ in
T.H. Tietenberg (ed.), Innovation in Environmental Policy
(1992) p. 243; J.J. Norton, R.M. Auerback and J.M. Gaba
Environmental Liability for Banks (1995).
94 See B.J. Richardson and J. Razzaque, ‘‘Public Participa-
tion in Environmental Decision-Making’’ in B.J. Richard-
son and S. Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability
(2006): forthcoming.
95 Freshfields, supra pp. 14–23.
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EPs.96 In particular, the Equator banks are finding the
assessment of social issues and impacts particularly
challenging. While there are well-developed EIA
methodologies that banks can use, this is not the case
for human rights and social issues. Social impacts are
very hard to predict, and such impacts can be very site-
specific.97
BankTrack also sees room for improvement. It
argued that the EPs should be adopted not through a
simple public announcement but through first making
formal changes to lending policies.98 Equator banks
could acquire their status through some kind of
assessment and verification process, as used for
subscription to certain corporate environmental man-
agement systems such as the European Union’s Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme or the standards and
codes of the International Organization for Standar-
dization.
BankTrack also recommended that loan covenants
be tailored better to each specific project financed.
Loan covenants should include affirmative and
negative environmental and social obligations, and
provide for the implementation of the environmental
management plan (for category A and B projects).99
BankTrack has demanded that Equator banks develop
adequate mechanisms and in-house capabilities to
monitor compliance with environmental and social
loan covenants on a similar basis as the standard
financial loan covenants. Equator Banks should also
create a joint ‘‘independent accountability mechan-
ism’’ (IAM) to ensure the implementation and
continuous improvement of the EPs and to provide
project affected communities a mechanism for
recourse.100 For example, the IAM could collect and
review Equator Banks’ annual public disclosures
regarding their implementation of the Principles. Like
the Freshfields study, BankTrack proposed the
appointment of an Ombudsman, ‘‘to provide people
or communities directly impacted by projects financed
by EP banks a recourse mechanism that is fair,
objective and constructive’’.101
These are not the only problems and challenges
facing the EPs. A wide range of technical and practical
issues remain unresolved, including the need for greater
due diligence by project sponsors and lenders, and for
lenders to be consulted and involved much earlier in the
project cycle if they are to exert more influence. Equator
banks also need to develop sector policies for environ-
mental protection that can provide a more detailed
policy framework than that offered by the EPs. Already,
for example, ABN Amro Bank has developed industry
sector policies for, among others, forestry, mining and
tobacco, while the HSBC has prepared a freshwater
policy, based in part on the World Commission on
Dams’ recommendations.102 A further immediate chal-
lenge concerns the IFC’s review of its Safeguard
Policies, on which the Principles are based. While a
substantial number of Equator banks are committed to
the EPs however they evolve, some lenders may find the
outcome of the IFC review (to be completed by late
2005) unpalatable. There is a risk of schism between
these two groups and some Equator banks may decide
to divorce themselves from the Principles.
Beyond project financing, there is the challenge of
developing and extending the EPs to other areas of
financial markets and institutional investors. Environ-
mental NGOs view the EPs as a springboard; they
should be a starting point of a much wider process of
reform, extending such principles not only to project
finance, but also to all bank activities, and eventually
to the financial markets generally.103 There has been
some resistance from Equator banks to such propo-
sals. It seems much easier to incorporate environ-
mental considerations into project finance transactions
than other banking activities. The project loan
documentation can include covenants such as default
and enforcement powers that give the banks much
more influence over the business of the borrower than
in the case of other types of lending transaction. Other
methods of financing such as general corporate
lending do not provide the opportunities for assess-
ment, monitoring and enforcement.
UNEP’s Financial Institutions Initiative, which
involves a wider array of financial entities including
insurance companies, already to some extent provides
such a broader framework for environmentally respon-
sible financing. But UNEP’s seeming lack of success
after nearly 15 years suggests that the key issue
ultimately may be not the extension of voluntary codes
and standards, but to reassess whether voluntary
mechanisms per se are an appropriate and adequate
tool for promoting environmentally sustainable
finance.104 Substantial empirical research is needed to
answer that question. We need to know a lot more
about the types of regulatory mechanisms that would
best induce change in the environmental performance
of the financial sector. Voluntary codes are one
instrument. Others include economic instruments such
as taxation incentives, direct command regulation and
informational policy tools like mandatory environmen-
tal reporting. Thus, whether the EPs prove to be merely
window-dressing or a significant change in the terms of
private financing for projects, is not yet clear. But there
is already some reason to be concerned that the former
rather than latter prognosis will be borne out.
96 Ibid. pp. 96–97.
97 Ibid.
98 Chan-Fishel, supra p. 3.
99 BankTrack, No U-Turn Allowed: Recommendations to the
Equator Banks (2004) p. 8.
100 Ibid. p. 9.
101 Ibid.
102 Chan-Fishel, supra p. 8.
103 Ibid. p. 1.
104 See e.g. criticisms of UNEP signatory banks’ involve-
ment in China’s controversial Three Gorges Dam: A Aslam,
‘‘Chinese Dam Tests ‘Green’ Banking Club’’ (13 Sept 1999)
Inter Press Service.
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